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Desperate Times Don’t Always Call for
Desperate Measures: Professional
Engineers v. Schwarzenegger Through
the Lens of the Contract Clause
By RACHEL MOROSKI*
Introduction
ON MARCH 10, 2011 Wisconsin lawmakers voted to strip nearly all
collective bargaining rights from public employees in the state.1 The
vote came as a rude awakening to many, notwithstanding the tumultu-
ous weeks of legislative and political theater that preceded it. In mid-
February, the Republican Governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker, intro-
duced a bill2 that sharply limited collective bargaining rights for most
of the state’s public employees.3 The Senate’s fourteen Democrats
were adamantly opposed to the bill.4 They fled the state for weeks,
thereby preventing the chamber from reaching the necessary quorum
to pass the bill.5 Intent on curbing public sector collective bargaining
rights, GOP leaders deleted the bill provisions that triggered the quo-
rum rule.6 Two hours after convening a special committee, the Repub-
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1. Wis. Assembly Cuts Public Worker Bargaining Rights, NPR (Mar. 10, 2011), http://
www.npr.org/2011/03/10/134419331/protests-swell-after-wis-senate-curbs-union-rights.
2. A.B. 11, 2011 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wis. 2011) (commonly referred to as 2011 Wiscon-
sin Act 10).
3. Wis. Assembly Cuts Public Worker Bargaining Rights, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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lican committee passed the amended bill.7 Minutes later, Republican
senators met and voted 18-1 in favor of the plan without one Demo-
crat present.8 The Senate’s Democrats were enraged. Democratic Sen-
ate Minority Leader Mark Miller said: “In 30 minutes, 18 state senators
undid 50 years of civil rights in Wisconsin. Their disrespect for the
people of Wisconsin and their rights is an outrage that will never be
forgotten.”9
The events in Wisconsin provide a dramatic example of a state
government stripping public sector employees of their collective bar-
gaining rights, but they are not without parallel. Less than a year ago,
the Supreme Court of California addressed a similar issue in Profes-
sional Engineers in California Government v. Schwarzenegger.10 In that case
unions challenged then-Governor Schwarzenegger’s Executive Or-
der11 unilaterally imposing California’s first-ever unpaid, two-day-a-
month furlough of most state employees.12 Over 200,000 state govern-
ment employees were required to miss work two days per month start-
ing in February 2009.13 The financial impact on furloughed
employees was far from theoretical. Sheila Byars, a forty-seven-year-old
Department of Motor Vehicles hearing officer in downtown Los Ange-
les, said the furloughs would cost her about $400 per month.14 “It
feels like we’re being punished because we chose a career in state gov-
ernment,” she said.15
California statutes governing public sector labor relations require
public employers to meet and confer with recognized employee orga-
nizations before implementing laws that will affect public employee
wages and salaries.16 The unions argued that Governor Schwarzeneg-
ger should have completed the collective bargaining process before
implementing the furloughs and that his failure to do so constituted
an unconstitutional impairment of contract.17 In a disjointed opinion,
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 1186 (Cal. 2010).
11. Cal. Exec. Order No. S-16-08 (Dec. 19, 2008), available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.
php?id=11310.
12. Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1190.
13. Furloughs Begin for Calif. State Workers, KCRA.COM (Feb. 6, 2009), http://www.kcra.
com/r/18655586/detail.html.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3517 (West 2010).
17. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 42, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000 v.
Schwarzenegger, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 52 (Ct. App. 2010) (No. C061020).
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which reflected the disorder stemming from the worst recession since
the Great Depression, the court ultimately concluded that the state
had the authority to implement the mandatory, unpaid, two-day-a-
month furlough program.18 The court largely sidestepped the collec-
tive bargaining issue.
The events in California and Wisconsin are not unique. Other
states with extreme budget deficits have grappled with whether to tar-
get public sector employees as a means to cut spending. Over half of
these states attempted to furlough public sector employees.19 Union
members and public employee organizations did not stand by and
watch silently—they turned to the judiciary. Several courts which have
addressed furloughs specifically, or infringements of government con-
tracts more generally, have done so under the Contract Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.20 Under the Contract Clause, actions that impair
government contracts are reviewed under heightened scrutiny.21 The
state bears the burden of proving that the contract impairment is rea-
sonable and necessary to serve a legitimate government purpose.22
A number of Professional Engineers plaintiffs argued in their briefs
that the furlough order unconstitutionally impaired their collective
bargaining contracts under the Contract Clause.23 Because the issue
was not raised in the petitions before the trial court, the California
Supreme Court declined to rule on the issue.24 This Comment sug-
gests that, had the court reviewed the Governor’s unilateral furlough
of public sector employees under the Contract Clause, the court
would have found the Governor’s action unconstitutional. This Com-
ment argues that the Contract Clause serves as an important and ef-
fective restriction when government entities attempt to modify
existing contractual agreements without first conferring with the rep-
resented employee organization. Analyzing Professional Engineers
through the lens of the Contract Clause should prove instructive for
both unions seeking to implement their rights and state government
officials seeking to remedy the state’s budget problems. The exercise
18. Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 1186, 1190 (Cal. 2010).
19. Katharine Q. Seelye, To Save Money, States Turn to Furloughs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/us/24furlough.html.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see, e.g., Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano,
183 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999); Donohue v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 306 (N.D.N.Y
2010).
21. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 30 (1977).
22. Id.
23. Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1197 n.11.
24. Id.
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demonstrates that honoring the Contract Clause is advantageous for
both parties. Since the Clause requires the state to consider all policy
alternatives before infringing public contracts, the result is a more col-
laborative, better informed strategy for addressing budget crises.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court’s analysis in Professional Engineers. Part II pro-
vides a brief background on the Contract Clause and examines how
two courts have dealt with impairments of public sector employment
contracts under the Contract Clause. Part III analyzes the furlough
program at issue in Professional Engineers under the Contract Clause,
finding that the furlough program unconstitutionally impaired the
public employees’ contracts. Finally, this Comment concludes that the
Contract Clause serves as a powerful tool for our nation’s public em-
ployees working under collective bargaining agreements.
I. The California Supreme Court’s Analysis in Professional
Engineers
A. Background
The financial crisis of 2008 was unique in its magnitude. How-
ever, California is no stranger to budget crises, as only a few examples
from recent history demonstrate. The aerospace boom of the 1980s
turned into a bust in the 1990s.25 The spectacular dotcom growth of
the late 1990s sputtered after 2000.26 Despite California’s recurring
cycle of boom to bust, prior to 2004 the state had no system in place to
deal with fiscal emergencies.27 In May of 2004, that changed when
California voters approved a ballot measure that added Article IV, sec-
tion 10, subdivision (f) to the California Constitution (hereinafter Ar-
ticle IV, section 10(f)).28 Under this new constitutional provision, the
Governor is authorized to declare a fiscal emergency if he or she de-
termines in the midst of a fiscal year that there will be a substantial,
unanticipated budget deficit for that year.29 Pursuant to the fiscal
emergency, the Governor may call a special legislative session and sub-
mit proposed legislation to address the problem.30
25. A Special Report on Democracy in California: The People’s Will, THE ECONOMIST, Apr.
23, 2011, at 3–4.
26. Id.
27. Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1198.
28. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(f).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Article IV, section 10(f) seemed to come at just the right time for
California. At the end of 2007 thirteen states, including California,
faced a combined budget shortfall of at least $23 billion for the 2009
fiscal year.31 A study from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
revealed that California, among nine other states, had prepared reve-
nue and spending projections for the 2009 fiscal year which failed to
anticipate diminished revenues that were insufficient to sustain state
services.32 California was in the worst position by far, with a staggering
projected budget gap of between $9.8 billion and $14 billion.33 Cali-
fornia’s fiscal circumstances continued to deteriorate as a result of the
credit market crisis and the national recession. By the end of 2008,
California’s budget deficit was projected to grow to at least $40 billion
by the end of the 2009–2010 fiscal year.34 State officials realized that
by as early as February 2009 the state would be unable to meet its
payroll and other financial obligations.35
On December 1, 2008, California’s then-Governor, Arnold
Schwarzenegger, declared a fiscal emergency pursuant to Article IV,
section 10(f).36 He called the Legislature into special session and then
submitted a comprehensive budget plan to address the budget prob-
lem.37 The plan included a proposal to furlough state employees one
day per month through the end of the 2009–2010 fiscal year.38 De-
spite the pressure to reduce spending, the Legislature rejected the
furlough plan and passed its own proposed budget legislation on De-
cember 18 (hereinafter, the 2008 Budget Act).39 The Legislature’s
plan reduced funding for state employees by $240 million for the
2009 fiscal year but required that sources of the savings be decided
through collective bargaining.40 In this way, the 2008 Budget Act spe-
cifically excluded the Governor’s recommended one-day-a-month fur-
lough provision. The following day, on December 19, Schwarzenegger
issued an executive order that would require all state workers em-
ployed by the executive branch to take two days of furlough each
31. Elizabeth McNichol & Iris J. Lav, 13 States Face Total Budget Shortfall of at Least $23
Billion in 2009; 11 Others Expect Budget Problems, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Dec.
18, 2007), http://www.cbpp.org/files/12-18-07sfp.pdf.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 1186, 1190 (Cal. 2010).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. S. Daily Journal, 2009–2010 Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. Dec 18, 2008).
40. S.B. 3, 2009–2010 Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 2008).
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month beginning February 9, 2009 and ending June 30, 2010.41 The
furlough plan would be implemented by closing most state offices on
the first and third Fridays of each month and would reduce workers’
hours and earnings by approximately ten percent.42 The Governor ul-
timately vetoed the Legislature’s proposed 2008 Budget Act.43
The Governor’s Executive Order was met with public employee
outrage. The president of Service Employees International Union Lo-
cal 1000 (“SEIU”)—the largest state employee union in North
America, representing 95,000 workers—stated that her members were
“disappointed and angry” with the Governor’s Executive Order.44
Shortly thereafter, SEIU filed a lawsuit in Sacramento Superior Court
challenging the order. Other unions took the same approach. The
Professional Engineers in California Government (“PECG”) and the
California Association of Professional Scientists (“CAPS”) also filed
suit in the Sacramento Superior Court.45 That case was consolidated
with the SEIU lawsuit and with a third lawsuit filed by the California
Attorneys, Administrative Law Judges, and Hearing Officers in State
Employment (“CASE”).46 The unions sought a writ of mandate di-
recting the Controller and the Governor to not implement the two-
day-a-month furlough order and a declaratory judgment finding the
Executive Order invalid.47 They claimed that the Governor did not
have the authority to unilaterally implement an involuntary furlough
of represented state employees, contending that only the Legislature
possessed such authority.48 On February 11, 2009, the Sacramento Su-
perior Court entered a judgment denying the petitions and ordering
the Controller to comply with the Governor’s furlough order.49
Plaintiffs appealed to the court of appeal. Before the court of ap-
peal could set a date for oral argument, the California Supreme Court
transferred the matter to itself and set oral argument for September 8,
2010.50
41. Cal. Exec. Order No. S-16-08 (Dec. 19, 2008).
42. Id.
43. Supplement to S. Daily Journal, 2009–2010 Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. Jan
7, 2009).
44. Matthew Yi, Governor Orders Layoffs, Unpaid Time Off, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2008, at
B1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/12/20/BA6G14RF
ID.DTL.
45. Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 1186, 1193 (Cal. 2010).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1004.
50. Id. at 1197.
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B. The California Supreme Court’s Decision
The California Supreme Court analyzed the issues presented in
Professional Engineers by posing two broad questions. The court first
addressed whether the Governor possessed the authority to impose
the two-day-a-month, unpaid furlough of state employees unilaterally
through his December 19, 2008 Executive Order.51 The court then
looked at whether the Legislature retroactively legitimized the Gover-
nor’s December 19th furlough Order by revising the 2008 Budget Act
to reflect the savings from the order.52 The court found for the em-
ployees on the first issue and the government on the second issue.53
1. Unilateral Furlough Order
The court concluded that the Governor and the Department of
Personnel Administration (“DPA”) lacked the authority to unilaterally
impose mandatory unpaid furloughs on state employees by executive
order.54 The court reached its conclusion on this issue after consider-
ing and striking down each of the Governor’s arguments. The Gover-
nor first claimed that his authority to unilaterally furlough state
employees in the face of a fiscal emergency sprung from Article V,
section 1 of the California Constitution.55 That section provides: “The
supreme executive power of this State is vested in the Governor. The
Governor shall see that the law is faithfully executed.”56 The court
observed that the Governor failed to back up his argument with a sin-
gle case or other supporting authority.57 Accordingly, the court held
that the Governor’s reliance on the broad language of Article V was
insufficient to counter the well established rule that under the Califor-
nia Constitution, the Legislature—not the Governor—has the ulti-
mate authority to set the terms and conditions of state employment
through legislative enactments, regardless of any fiscal emergency.58
The Governor alternatively argued that various provisions of the
California Government Code afforded him the unilateral authority to
impose unpaid furloughs.59 The Governor relied on section 19851,
51. Id. at 1099.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1100–01.
54. Id. at 1218–19.
55. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1; Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1200–01.
56. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1.
57. Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1201.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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subdivision (a), section 19849, and section 3516.5.60 The court con-
cluded that none of the provisions of the Government Code authorize
the Governor’s furlough program.61
Section 19851(a) lays out the general policy in California regard-
ing the workweek of state employees, stating that:
It is the policy of the state that the workweek of the state employee
shall be 40 hours, and that the workday of state employees eight
hours, except that workweeks and workdays of a different number
of hours may be established in order to meet the varying needs of
different state agencies. It is the policy of the state to avoid the
necessity for overtime work whenever possible.62
The court rejected the Governor’s argument that the first sen-
tence of section 19851(a)—establishing a forty-hour workweek and
eight-hour day—authorized his furlough order.63 The furlough plan
did not establish different hours to meet the diverse needs of different
agencies, as the Governor argued.64 Rather, the plan imposed a blan-
ket rule on all state executive branch agencies with no consideration
or even awareness of their “varying” needs.65 The court also held that
both the text and the legislative history of section 19851(a) demon-
strates that the primary purpose of the section’s delineation of “work-
week” is to establish the number of hours a state employee must work
before he or she is entitled to receive overtime compensation.66 Using
this construction of the statute, the Governor’s furlough plan has no
effect on the workweek. In weeks where state employees are required
to take an unpaid furlough day, the employee’s workweek is still forty
hours for purposes of section 19851(a), and the employee only be-
comes eligible for overtime if he or she works more than forty hours
that week.67 Finally, the court noted that the Governor’s reliance on
19851(a) was unfitting because the furlough program’s primary pur-
pose was to cut state expenses by reducing appropriations for state
employee salaries, not to reduce workdays.68
60. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 19851(a), 19849 (West 2003); id. § 3516.5 (West 2010); Prof’l
Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1207.
61. Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1213.
62. GOV’T § 19851(a).
63. Id.; Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1208.
64. Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1208.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1208–09.
67. Id. at 1210. The court also rejected the argument advanced by a number of plain-
tiffs that section 19851(a) should be interpreted to preclude the Governor from adopting
the furlough program. Id.
68. Id. at 1211.
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The court quickly disposed of the Governor’s argument based on
section 19849, which provides that the DPA shall “adopt rules gov-
erning hours of work and overtime compensation.”69 The court rea-
soned that if section 19851(a) did not authorize the Governor to
implement the furloughs, then section 19849, which simply authorizes
the DPA to adopt administrative rules for the state employer to en-
force, could not provide independent authority.70
The court also rejected the Governor’s argument that Govern-
ment Code section 3516.5 authorized the unilaterally imposed fur-
loughs. That section lays out two courses of action for employers
seeking to implement laws that will directly affect represented state
employees. The first part lays out the rule for ordinary circumstances:
Except in cases of emergency . . . the employer shall give reasona-
ble notice to each recognized employee organization affected by
any law . . . directly related to matters within the scope of represen-
tation proposed to be adopted by the employer, and shall give such
recognized employee organizations the opportunity to meet and
confer with the administrative officials or their delegated repre-
sentatives as may be properly designated by the law.71
The second part of the statute lays out the rule for emergencies:
In cases of emergency when the employer determines that a law . . .
must be adopted immediately without prior notice or meeting with
a recognized employee organization, the administrative officials or
their delegated representatives as may be properly designated by
law shall provide such notice and opportunity to meet and confer
in good faith at the earliest practical time following the adoption of
such law.72
The court flatly rejected the Governor’s argument that section
3516.5 authorized him to institute his involuntary furlough program.
The court observed that the plain language of section 3516.5 did not
“constitute a source of substantive authority for the state to take any
particular type of action regarding the terms and conditions of em-
ployment.”73 The statute simply provides that when an employer pos-
sesses the authority from some other source to implement a law that
affects represented state employees, it may follow one of two courses
of action.74 In ordinary circumstances the employer must notify and
meet and confer with the organization before implementing the law. In
69. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 19849 (West 2003).
70. Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1212.
71. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3516.5 (West 2010).
72. Id.
73. Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1212.
74. Id.
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an emergency, however, the employer may take action and then notify
and meet and confer with the organization as soon as practicable.75
Finally, the court addressed whether some other provision not
raised by the parties authorized the Governor or the DPA to unilater-
ally institute mandatory furloughs. The court examined Government
Code section 19826, which governs the DPA’s authority to establish or
adjust public employee salaries.76 As an initial matter, the court ex-
plained that furloughs unequivocally adjust the salaries of public em-
ployees (i.e., they do not simply adjust the schedule or hours an
employee works).77 The statute demonstrates that the Governor’s au-
thority over employees varies significantly depending on whether or
not the employee is represented, i.e., a member of a union.78 With
regard to represented employees, the establishment and adjustment of
salaries must be determined through the collective bargaining pro-
cess.79 The Governor or DPA was therefore prohibited from unilater-
ally imposing a mandatory unpaid furlough on represented employees
unless explicitly granted that authority by the terms of a Memoran-
dum of Understanding (“MOU”).80
2. Revised 2008 Budget Act
In mid-February 2009, soon after the Governor’s furlough order
went into effect and in further response to the fiscal emergency, the
Legislature enacted and the Governor signed legislation that revised
the 2008 Budget Act.81 The new legislation reduced the 2008–2009
fiscal year appropriation for employee compensation by an amount
which precisely reflected the savings the Governor sought to achieve
through his controversial two-day-a-month furlough order.82 The re-
vised 2008 Budget Act provided that:
(a) [E]ach item of appropriation in this act . . . shall be re-
duced, as appropriate, to reflect a reduction in employee compen-
sation achieved through the collective bargaining process for
represented employees or through existing administration author-
ity and a proportionate reduction for nonrepresented employees
(utilizing existing authority of the administration to adjust com-
pensation for nonrepresented employees) in the total amounts of
75. Id. at 1212–13.
76. Id. at 1215.
77. Id. at 1216.
78. Id. at 1215.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1217.
81. Id. at 1194.
82. Id. at 1222.
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$385,762,000 from General Fund items and $285,196,000 from
items relating to other funds.
(b) The Department of Personnel Administration shall trans-
mit proposed memoranda of understanding to the Legislature
promptly and shall include with each such transmission estimated
savings pursuant to this section of each agreement.
(c) Nothing in this section shall change or supersede the pro-
visions of the Ralph C. Dills Act.83
The plaintiff employee organizations and the Governor strongly
disagreed over the meaning of this legislation. Plaintiffs maintained
that for represented employees (such as the state employees in this
case), appropriations could only be reduced through the collective
bargaining process.84 The Governor countered that reductions for
represented employees could be achieved through either the collective
bargaining process or through existing authority.85 The court agreed
with the Governor’s interpretation, finding that the first part of the
legislation laid out alternative means of achieving reductions for rep-
resented employees, while the second part of the clause laid out the
means of achieving reductions for non-represented employees.86 The
court reasoned that any other interpretation would make the paren-
thetical clause superfluous.87
The parties also disputed whether the term “existing authority”
could reasonably be interpreted to include the Governor’s two-day-a-
month furlough plan. In their trial briefs, plaintiff employee organiza-
tions argued that both the language of subsection (a) and the express
reference to the Dills Act (which requires public employers to meet
and confer with recognized employee organizations before imple-
menting laws that will affect public employee wages and salaries)88 in
subsection (b) suggest that “existing authority” refers to the possibility
that the Governor, through the collective bargaining process, had al-
ready reached agreements with the bargaining representatives of vari-
ous employee organizations regarding furloughs.89
The court, in contrast, concluded that “existing authority” could
reasonably be interpreted to mean that reductions could be achieved
through the then-existing furlough plan authorized by the Governor
83. S.B. 2, 2009–2010 Leg., 3d Extraordinary Sess. § 36 (Cal. 2009).
84. Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1222.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 3516–3516.5 (West 2010).
89. Letter Brief of Appellants at 7, Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Schwarzenegger, 239
P.3d 1186 (2010) (No. S183411).
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through executive order, even though the appellate courts had not yet
determined whether the Governor was authorized to impose the fur-
loughs unilaterally.90 The court dismissed plaintiffs’ argument, stating
that “nothing in the Dills Act precludes the Legislature from adopting
such a furlough plan through legislative enactment as one method of
reducing the compensation of state employees when such cuts are
found necessary and appropriate in light of the state’s fiscal condi-
tion.”91 The court concluded that while the Governor lacked the au-
thority to reduce employee pay through furloughs, the Legislature
retroactively legitimized the Governor’s December 19th furlough or-
der by adopting the revised 2008 Budget Act legislation that reflected
the savings from the order.92
II. The Contract Clause and Public Contracts
The Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o
state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts.”93 Similarly, the California Constitution provides that a “law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed.”94 The Clause
serves as a protection against state and local laws that interfere with
rights under existing contracts.95 A state action impairs a contractual
obligation when it “prevents or materially limits the contractor’s abil-
ity to enforce his contractual rights,” for example, by limiting reme-
dies that would otherwise be available in a contractual relationship
between two private parties.96 In the public employee context, when a
state government entity with lawmaking authority, such as the state
legislature, enacts a law that trumps the terms of a collective bargain-
90. Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1222.
91. Id. at 1223.
92. Id.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
94. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9. For simplicity, I will refer to the federal and state Contract
Clauses collectively as the “Contract Clause” or “Clause.”
95. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 264 (1827) (holding that the
Contract Clause only applies to already existing contracts); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 139–40 (1810) (holding that the Contract Clause applied not only to contracts
between private parties, but also to contracts to which a state was a party). The Contract
Clause does not apply to federal laws that interfere with contractual rights. ERWIN CHEMER-
INSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 647 (3d ed. 2009).
96. Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). In
Horowitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 78 F.3d 1248, 1250–51 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh
Circuit noted that courts differentiate between state actions which establish mere breach of
contract and those which rise to the level of an impairment of contract. The Contract
Clause is not implicated in the former context, in part because the injured party retains the
right to recover damages for the breach. Id.
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ing agreement, the Clause may serve as a limitation on the entity’s
lawmaking authority.97 The Clause also applies when a court issues a
ruling that interferes with the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement.98
The vitality of the Contract Clause has varied over the years. For
the first century of our nation’s history, the Contract Clause served as
the chief federal constitutional limit on state and local regulation of
business.99 Litigants and courts employed the Clause aggressively dur-
ing this time because it was the only constitutional provision that
could be used to limit state interference with property rights.100 The
Clause became less powerful in the years following adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the growth of the Supreme Court’s sub-
stantive due process jurisprudence.101 For example, for a brief period
following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Lochner v. New York,102
the Clause became largely superfluous because the Due Process
Clause protected both existing and future contracts, whereas the Con-
tract Clause protected only existing contracts.103 In the New Deal era,
state and local legislation served largely to protect employee rights.
During this time, courts generally deferred to state legislative impair-
ments whenever a state regulation was seen as a legitimate exercise of
the state’s police powers.104
97. Stephen F. Befort, Unilateral Alteration of Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements
and the Contract Clause, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011).
98. See Bradley v. Super. Ct., 310 P.2d 634, 640 (Cal. 1957) (“Neither the court nor
the Legislature may impair the obligation of a valid contract and a court cannot lawfully
disregard the provisions of such a contract or deny to either party his rights thereunder.”);
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 44, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000 v. Schwarzenegger,
112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 52 (Ct. App. 2010) (No. C061020).
99. Leo Clarke, The Contracts Clause: A Basis for Limited Judicial Review of State Economic
Regulation, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 183, 187 (1985).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 187–88.
102. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that the freedom to contract
was a basic liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Id.
at 53.
103. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 264 (1827) (holding that the
Contract clause only applies to already existing contracts); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 95, at
647; see also Befort, supra note 97, at 22 (noting that the “relative importance of the con-
tract clause began to wane following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment” because
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to both existing and future contracts, while the Con-
tract Clause only serves as a protection for existing contracts).
104. See Clarke, supra note 99, at 190–92; see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934) (“The question is not whether the legislative action affects con-
tracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.”).
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In 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court breathed new life into the Con-
tract Clause when it decided United States Trust Co. of New York v. New
Jersey.105 The case presented a challenge to a 1974 New Jersey statute
that, together with a parallel New York statute, repealed a statutory
covenant made between the two states in 1962. The 1962 covenant
prohibited the Port Authority of New Jersey and New York from using
toll revenues to subsidize railroad passenger service.106 United States
Trust Company of New York, as both a trustee for and holder of Port
Authority bonds, brought suit claiming that the New Jersey statute im-
paired the obligation of the States’ contract with the bondholders.107
The Court held that the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution pro-
hibited the retroactive repeal of the 1962 covenant.108
United States Trust adopted a heightened standard for examining
laws that impair public contracts.109 The Court formulated a tripartite
framework to balance the vested rights of individuals under existing
contracts with the states’ need to invoke their police power to provide
for the welfare of their citizens. Under this standard, courts examine:
(1) whether a contractual obligation is present, (2) whether the state’s
actions impaired that contract, and (3) whether the impairment was
reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.110
The Court reasoned that, in the context of public contracts, “com-
plete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and ne-
cessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake.”111
When a state is a party to its own contract, that state is “not completely
free to consider impairing the obligations of its own contract on par
with other policy alternatives.”112
After United States Trust, courts distinguish between government
interference with private contracts and government interference with
its own contractual obligations, using a much stricter standard of re-
view for the latter interference.113 Thus, while the Contract Clause
may still be applied to laws that impact private contracts, it is most
105. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 32.
109. Id. at 25–26.
110. Id. at 21, 26.
111. Id. at 26.
112. Id. at 30.
113. Clarke, supra note 99, at 198.
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frequently implemented to limit states’ power to modify contracts to
which they are a party.114
A. The Ninth Circuit Questions Emergency Pay Day Delay
Legislation
Public employees are a politically expedient target when states
are forced to cut spending. However, when courts analyze contractual
impairments under the federal Contract Clause, the easiest methods
of cutting spending often do not prevail. In University of Hawaii Profes-
sional Assembly v. Cayetano, Hawaii state employees challenged a statute
which allowed the State to postpone by several days, at six different
times, the dates on which state employees were paid.115 The Ninth
Circuit held that a state statute that delayed the issuance of payroll
checks substantially impaired a collective bargaining agreement and
violated the federal Contract Clause.116
Following the United States Trust framework, the court initially
concluded that the collective bargaining agreement constituted a con-
tractual agreement between Hawaii state employees and the State.117
The court found that “a course of dealing can create a contractual
expectation.”118 Thus, although the collective bargaining agreements
contained no specific pay day provisions, the State and its employees
had maintained an understanding for over twenty-five years that em-
ployees would be paid on the fifteenth and last days of each month.119
This understanding was sufficient to constitute a contractual agree-
ment for the purposes of Contract Clause analysis.
The court found that the pay delay impaired collective bargain-
ing agreements.120 In determining whether an impairment is substan-
tial, courts must consider the extent to which the affected employees’
reasonable expectations under the contract are disrupted.121 Here,
the court observed that “[p]laintiffs are wage earners, not volunteers,”
and that the state employees had “bills, child support obligations,
mortgage payments, insurance premiums, and other responsibili-
ties.”122 As such, plaintiffs reasonably relied on the timely receipt of
114. See Befort, supra note 97, at 24.
115. Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1102.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 1104–06.
121. Id. at 1105.
122. Id. at 1106.
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their paychecks.123 Even a slight delay could be extremely
detrimental.
Having determined that the Hawaii statute constituted a substan-
tial impairment of contract, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the
impairment was reasonable and necessary to fulfill an important pub-
lic purpose. The court initially addressed the level of deference af-
forded to a state where the employees were on the payroll of the
government entity that impaired those rights. Courts are “less defer-
ential to a state’s judgment of reasonableness and necessity when a
state’s legislation is self serving and impairs the obligations of its own
contracts.”124 Courts have subsequently referred to this heightened
level of scrutiny as “less deference scrutiny.”125 This more exacting
standard is appropriate in this context because “[a] governmental en-
tity can always find a use for extra money, especially when taxes do not
have to be raised.”126 To determine reasonableness under less defer-
ence scrutiny, courts look to the extent of the impairment and the
public purpose served by the impairment.127 The federal Contract
Clause prohibits states from impairing contractual obligations without
first pursuing other policy alternatives.128 A contractual impairment is
not considered necessary if it imposes an extreme impairment when
an apparent and more moderate method would be equally as effective
or if the contractual impairment was unreasonable based on the sur-
rounding circumstances.129
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Hawaii statute was neither
reasonable nor necessary.130 Defendants could have pursued other
less politically favorable alternatives, such as a federal maximization
project, the repeal of tax credits, or raising taxes.131 Defendants failed
to articulate why Hawaii’s budgetary problems were best solved by
targeting state personnel.132 Additionally, the court found that de-
fendants acted unreasonably in light of the surrounding circum-
stances, pointing out that contractual impairments are not reasonable
if the problem the state seeks to remedy with the impairment existed
123. See id.
124. Id. at 1107 (citing Condell v. Bress, 983 F.2d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 1993)).
125. Donohue v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 306, 321 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
126. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
127. Univ. of Haw., 183 F.3d at 1107.
128. See U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 30–31 (1977).
129. Univ. of Haw., 183 F.3d at 1107.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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at the time the parties entered the contractual agreement.133 In this
case, defendants were aware of the fiscal crisis at the time the collec-
tive bargaining agreement was entered into.134 After weighing the
competing hardships, the Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs had
shown a likelihood of success on the merits.135
B. The Northern District of New York Blocks Implementation of
Furloughs
A federal district court in New York reached a similar outcome to
University of Hawaii in 2010. In Donohue v. Paterson, the court used the
federal Contract Clause to strike down wage freeze and furlough pro-
visions initiated by the Governor in the wake of the most recent fiscal
emergency.136 With a projected budget gap of $6.8 billion for fiscal
year 2011, New York faced the fourth largest projected budget gap in
the nation.137 Like California, the State of New York is a party to col-
lective bargaining agreements with numerous public employee orga-
nizations.138 As such, the State agrees to contracts establishing the
terms and conditions of employment for members of the represented
organizations. Nonetheless, in response to the fiscal crisis, the Gover-
nor of New York submitted and the Legislature passed, emergency
appropriation “extender bills.”139 The bills contained furlough and
wage provisions which resulted in a twenty percent pay reduction for
affected workers and specifically eliminated for certain workers the
raises previously negotiated through collective bargaining.140
Unions and union officials representing public employees chal-
lenged the emergency appropriation extender bills under the federal
Contract Clause.141 The court initially found that the challenged pro-
visions of the extender bills constituted a substantial impairment of
contract.142 The court held that full-time employment and contracted
for workers’ salary increases were fundamental aspects of the collec-
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1108.
136. Donohue v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 306, 325 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
137. Colin Barr, More and More States on Budget Brink, CNNMONEY (Jan. 17, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/01/14/news/economy/states.woes.fortune/index.htm?post
version=2010011713&iid=EL.
138. Donohue, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 313.
139. Id. An “extender bill” temporarily funds the continued operation of the State in
the absence of an official budget. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 311–14.
142. Id. at 319.
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tive bargaining agreement that plaintiffs had bargained for.143 As
such, the State disrupted plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations under the
contracts by seeking to reduce full-time employment and to delay con-
tracted for increases in salaries.144
The court next turned to whether the bills served a legitimate
public purpose. For the sake of argument, the court agreed with de-
fendants145 that the fiscal crisis constituted a legitimate public pur-
pose.146 However, the court noted that a state government’s authority
to substantially impair its own contracts in furtherance of a legitimate
public purpose is less compelling where the government has strayed
from the ordinary course of its constitutional process.147 Because of
the emergency nature of the appropriation bills, the executive and
legislative bodies did not have the opportunity to evaluate, in their
respective capacities, how best to serve the public good.148 Rather,
“the contractual impairments were the sudden and sole work of the
Executive and were proposed in a manner that largely precluded leg-
islative deliberation.”149
Turning to the reasonable and necessary prong, the court noted
that defendants’ inability to cite any legislative consideration of policy
alternatives cast “serious doubt” on the reasonableness and necessity
of the extender bills.150 Additionally, the court was not persuaded by
defendants’ exclusive reliance on the state’s fiscal difficulties and au-
tomatic rejection of plaintiffs’ suggested alternatives. Defendants
failed to articulate either why they targeted unionized state employees
or why they had not considered alternatives that imposed a less severe
burden on contracts.151 The court also found that defendants had ac-
ted unreasonably in light of the surrounding circumstances.152 The
emergency nature of the extender bills did not allow for normal legis-
lative deliberation.153 Consequently, “the question of reasonableness
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Defendants’ briefs emphasized the severity of New York’s fiscal crisis: “The State of
New York is in the midst of the most serious and sustained economic downturn since the
Great Depression.” Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Prelim-
inary Injunction at 1, Donohue v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 306 (N.D.N.Y 2010) (No. 1:10-
CV-00549).
146. Donohue, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
147. Id. at 320.
148. See id. at 321.
149. Id. at 320.
150. Id. at 322.
151. Id. at 323.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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and necessity of the provisions [was] buried within a precarious legis-
lative choice, as a vote for approval [was] a vote against shutdown.”154
After completing its United States Trust analysis, the court concluded
that the challenged provisions of the extender bills constituted an un-
constitutional impairment of contract.155
III. Professional Engineers Through the Contract Clause Lens
In Professional Engineers, SEIU argued that the Governor’s Execu-
tive Order constituted an unconstitutional impairment of contract.156
The trial court refused to address the unconstitutional impairment of
contract issue because SEIU had not raised the claim in its writ peti-
tion.157 A number of plaintiffs also raised the same claim in briefs filed
with the California Supreme Court, but the court declined to address
the issue for the same reason: because the employees did not raise the
claim in their petitions, the issue was not properly before the court.158
This Comment analyzes the unconstitutional impairment of contract
claim that both courts declined to address. This Comment argues
that, had the issue been property before the court, the court would
have found that the furlough plan violated the Contract Clause of
both the United States and California Constitutions.
As recognized by Professor Stephen F. Befort, “[c]ontract clause
analysis under the United States Trust standard is a fact-intensive en-
deavor.”159 The court must first determine whether there has been a
substantial impairment of contract and then conduct a precise balanc-
ing of factors relating to whether the impairment was reasonable and
necessary under the circumstances. Applying the United States Trust
principles to Professional Engineers compels only one conclusion: the
154. Id.
155. Id. at 325.
156. Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 1186, 1197 (Cal. 2010).
157. Id. SEIU’s failure to raise the unconstitutional impairment of contract claim in its
writ petition may have been a litigation strategy. The Contract Clause is not implicated
unless a “law” impairs an already existing contract. SEIU’s original argument hinged on
the lack of authority for Governor Schwarzenegger to implement furloughs by executive
order alone. No legislative authority existed to support the Governor’s Executive Order, as
the Legislature had not yet passed the revised 2008 Budget Act. Thus, from SEIU’s per-
spective, there was simply no “law” to implicate the Contract Clause. Another potential
reason why SEIU initially declined to raise the Contract Clause claim was that that the
MOUs affected by the Governor’s order were expired, though they remained binding by
virtue of a continuing benefits provision of the California Government Code. For a more
detailed discussion of the expired MOU issue see infra Part III.A.
158. Id.
159. Befort, supra note 97, at 40.
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Governor’s implementation of involuntary, unpaid furloughs on rep-
resented state employees constituted an unconstitutional impairment
of contract.
A. The Contractual Relationship
Under United States Trust, the first inquiry is whether a contractual
agreement existed between the California employees and the State.
The payment of salary to public employees involves obligations pro-
tected by the Contract Clause of the Constitution.160 In California,
statutes governing public sector labor relations grant public employ-
ees private contractual rights enforceable against the State.161 Specifi-
cally, the Ralph C. Dills Act requires public employers to meet and
confer in good faith with recognized employee organizations on all
matters relating to employment conditions, including wages.162 If the
parties reach an agreement, they must memorialize it in a Memoran-
dum of Understanding and present it to the Legislature for ap-
proval.163 Once approved by the Legislature, an MOU becomes
“indubitably binding.”164 In Professional Engineers, the California Su-
preme Court found that the Dills Act makes it “clear that an MOU,
once approved by the Legislature (either directly . . . or through the
appropriation of sufficient funds to pay the agreed-upon employee
compensation), governs the wages and hours of the state employees
covered by the MOU.”165 Thus, a state’s repudiation of its obligations
under an indubitably binding contract may constitute a Contract
Clause violation.
In University of Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit found that a contractual
agreement governing pay days existed even where the collective bar-
gaining agreements between employees and the State contained no
specific pay day provisions.166 The court reasoned that the employees
had developed an understanding that they would be paid on certain
days.167 This understanding, the court concluded, was sufficient evi-
dence of a contractual agreement for Contract Clause purposes.168
Following the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, a contractual agreement
160. See Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 802 (Cal. 1947).
161. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 3512–3524 (West 2010).
162. Id. §§ 3516, 3517, 3570.
163. Id. § 3517.5.
164. Glendale City Emps.’ Ass’n v. City of Glendale, 540 P.2d 609, 615 (Cal. 1975).
165. Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 1186, 1219 (Cal. 2010).
166. Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999).
167. Id.
168. Id.
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surely existed in Professional Engineers because the California employ-
ees’ expectations were based on both an “understanding” and on an
actual labor contract. When Governor Schwarzenegger issued his Ex-
ecutive Order on December 19, 2008, the terms of labor contracts
explicitly governed the salaries and hours of the state employees at
issue in this case.169 Governor Schwarzenegger circumvented the col-
lective bargaining requirements of the Dills Act by unilaterally impos-
ing furloughs.
The existing MOUs of each employee organization explicitly laid
out salary and benefit levels. Additionally, the MOUs specifically ad-
dressed the possibility of furloughs as an alternative to layoffs. The
MOUs made clear that the State had to notify and meet and confer
with the unions before resorting to furloughs.170 One of the MOUs il-
lustrates the clarity with which the employee organizations addressed
the issue:
Whenever the State determines it is necessary to lay off employees,
the State and the Union shall meet in good faith to explore alter-
natives to laying off employees such as . . . voluntary reduced work
time . . . . The State may propose to reduce the number of hours
an employee works as an alternative to lay-off. Prior to implementa-
tion of this alternative to a layoff, the State will notify and meet and
confer with the Union to seek concurrence of the usage of this
alternative.171
While all of the applicable MOUs in the instant case had expired
on June 30, 2008, they continued to bind the parties. Under the “con-
tinuing benefits” provision of the Dills Act, the terms of the expired
MOUs remain in effect until a new agreement is reached through col-
lective bargaining or the parties reach an impasse in negotiations.172
The continuing benefits provision of the Dills Act constitutes an im-
plied legislative declaration that the provisions of public employee col-
lective bargaining agreements, even if expired, warrant special
169. Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1218–19.
170. Id. at 1219 n.35.
171. Agreement Between State of Cal. and Cal. Attorneys, Admin. Law Judges and
Hearing Officers in State Employment (CASE) Covering Bargaining Unit 2 Attorneys and
Hearing Officers §§ 10.2–10.3, Effective July 1, 2005 Through June 30, 2007 (emphasis
added), available at http://www.dpa.ca.gov/bargaining/contracts/pdf/bu02/20050701-
20070630/mou.pdf.
172. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3517.8(a) (West 2010) provides:
If a memorandum of understanding has expired, and the Governor and the
recognized employee organization have not agreed to a new memorandum of
understanding and have not reached an impasse in negotiations . . . the parties to
the agreement shall continue to give effect to the provisions of the expired mem-
orandum of understanding . . . .
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protection. In the instant case, the parties had not even begun the
meet and confer process, let alone continued to impasse.173 The Gov-
ernor and the DPA conceded, and the California Supreme Court con-
firmed, that the expired MOUs continued to govern the salaries and
hours of state employees affected by the furloughs.174
Additionally, the California Supreme Court held that the Legisla-
ture had approved the MOUs when it adopted the initial 2008 Budget
Act. The appropriations in the initial Budget Act reflected the level of
compensation paid to state employees before the furloughs.175 “[B]y
enacting appropriations in the initial 2008 Budget Act that were con-
sistent with the higher level of compensation at which the employees
were being paid before the furlough was implemented, the Legisla-
ture approved that level of compensation.”176 Thus, when the Legisla-
ture adopted the initial Budget Act, the MOUs between represented
state employees and the State (which excluded the two-day-a-month
furlough program) became “indubitably binding” contracts.
B. Substantial Contractual Impairment
The second inquiry under United States Trust is to determine
whether the furloughs substantially impaired the contract between
California employees and the State. The California employees must
prove that their reasonable expectations under the contract were dis-
rupted. In considering whether uncompensated furloughs constituted
a substantial contractual impairment in Donohue v. Paterson, the dis-
trict court recognized that full-time employment was a fundamental
aspect of the collective bargaining agreements that New York employ-
ees bargained for and upon which they reasonably relied.177 The same
reasoning holds true in the instant matter. California public employ-
ees committed themselves to personal long-term obligations including
mortgages, credit cards, car payments, insurance premiums, and child
support with the expectation that they would continue receiving their
full time salary. An involuntary furlough program resulting in a ten
percent pay reduction is certainly a substantial impairment to a public
employee confronted with these monthly debt payments and the daily
expenses for food and other necessities of life. “For a poor man . . . to
lose part of his salary often means his family will go without the essen-
173. See Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1190, 1218–19.
174. Id. at 1218–19.
175. Id. at 1220.
176. Id.
177. Donohue v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 306, 319 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
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tials.”178 Less time for less pay is “only an option for workers who can
afford to make the trade-off.”179
C. State’s Justification
1. Legitimate Public Purpose
After a substantial impairment of contract is found, in order to
withstand a Contract Clause challenge the Governor must establish
that the furloughs serve a legitimate public purpose. As a general rule,
the purpose of the impairment cannot “be simply the financial benefit
of the sovereign.”180 Some courts have found that a state govern-
ment’s fiscal emergency may constitute a legitimate public purpose.181
When Governor Schwarzenegger ordered the two-day-a-month fur-
lough of state employees, he based it on a fiscal emergency—a $15
billion deficit that was projected to grow to a $42 billion budget gap
over the following eighteen months if revenues and expenses contin-
ued as expected.182 While Governor Schwarzenegger’s furloughs fi-
nancially benefited the state, the nationwide fiscal crisis and the
attendant strains on the California budget certainly caused a fiscal
emergency. In this sense, a court could reasonably find that the Gov-
ernor’s attempt to reduce the staggering budget deficit constituted a
legitimate public purpose. However, echoing the federal district court
in Donohue v. Paterson, “the public purpose inquiry as to the chal-
lenged provision is not immediately resolved by reference to the
State’s budgetary problems.”183 A state government’s authority to sub-
stantially impair one of its contracts, even in the face of a staggering
budget deficit, is less compelling where the government has strayed
from the course of its ordinary constitutional process.184
The district court in Donohue doubted the existence of a legiti-
mate public purpose where “the contractual impairments were the
sudden and sole work of the Executive and were proposed in a man-
ner that largely precluded legislative deliberation.”185 The court rea-
178. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 342 n.9 (1969) (quoting
114 CONG. REC. 1833 (1968) (statement of Rep. Henry Gonzalez)).
179. Michael Z. Green, Unpaid Furloughs and Four-Day Work Weeks: Employer Sympathy or a
Call for Collective Employee Action, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1139, 1167 (2010).
180. Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 368 (2d Cir. 2006).
181. Id. at 369.
182. Studies Point to Folly of Across-the-Board Furloughs, CAL. PUB. EMP. REL. J., Nov. 2009,
at 45.
183. Donohue v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 306, 320 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
184. Id. at 321.
185. Id. at 320.
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soned that the executive and legislative bodies had not, in their
respective capacities, had the opportunity to evaluate what the public
good was and how best to serve it. In the present case, Governor
Schwarzenegger similarly strayed from the ordinary course of Califor-
nia’s constitutional process. The Legislature expressly disapproved of
Schwarzenegger’s furlough provision, as illustrated by its refusal to in-
clude furloughs in its initial 2008 Budget Act.186 The Legislature made
clear that reductions in appropriations for state employees were to be
achieved through the collective bargaining process.187 In rejecting the
Governor’s initial proposal to implement furloughs, the Legislature
denied the legitimacy of the contractual impairment created by the
furloughs. Governor Schwarzenegger ignored the Legislature’s disap-
proval and implemented the furloughs by executive order.
Following the Governor’s Executive Order, California’s elected
officials, including Controller John Chiang and Treasurer Bill
Lockyer, refused to participate in the furloughs, citing both economic
and legal concerns.188 In a letter to DPA Director David Gilb, Trea-
surer Lockyer wrote: “We will not comply with an Executive Order
that we are convinced does not rest on solid legal grounds and which
would impose such a hardship on the backs of our employees.”189
Controller Chiang joined the unions in their suit against the State,
publicly refusing to comply with the Order until compelled to do so
by court order.190
The vocal opposition to the Order by both the Legislature and
other key state officials demonstrates the widely-held perception that
the furloughs were implemented on dubious procedural grounds.191
The circumstances surrounding the Order cast doubt on the claim
that the furloughs furthered a legitimate public purpose. Nonetheless,
this Comment, like the court in Donohue, assumes for the sake of argu-
186. See Unions Challenge Furlough and Layoff Order, CAL. PUB. EMP. REL. J., Feb. 2009, at
40 (“the Democrat’s budget required that sources of the savings be decided through col-
lective bargaining”).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 41; Local 1000 Fights Governor’s Demand for Unpaid Furloughs Starting Next
Month, SEIU LOCAL 1000, Jan. 17, 2009, at 1 [hereinafter SEIU Local 1000 Union Update],
available at http://seiu1000.org/union_update/update_01_14_09.pdf.
189. Id.
190. See Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 1186, 1193, 1197 (Cal.
2010).
191. The following state elected officials also issued statements saying they would cut
costs but would not comply with the Governor’s furlough plan: Attorney General Jerry
Brown, Secretary of State Debra Bowen, Lt. Governor John Garamendi, and State Superin-
tendent of Schools Jack O’Connell. SEIU Local 1000 Union Update, supra note 188, at 1.
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ment that the Governor’s attempt to deal with California’s financial
crisis constituted a legitimate public purpose. As such, this Comment
shall analyze whether the furlough order was reasonable and neces-
sary to narrow California’s expanding budget gap.
2. Reasonable and Necessary Means
To withstand challenge under the Contract Clause, the furlough
order must be reasonable and necessary to meet the stated legitimate
public purpose. Here, like the states involved in Donohue and University
of Hawaii, the State of California is a party to the contract at issue. As
such, complete deference to the Governor’s judgment of reasonable-
ness and necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is
at stake. The Contract Clause, if it is to mean anything, must prohibit
California from violating its own contractual obligations when other
policy alternatives are available. As noted by the California Supreme
Court, the terms of a binding MOU must be honored, otherwise
“[w]hat point would there be in reducing it to writing, if the terms of
the contract were of no legal consequence?”192 To justify the substan-
tial contractual impairment, Governor Schwarzenegger would have
had to show that the furloughs were reasonable in light of the sur-
rounding circumstances and that he considered other alternatives
before unilaterally implementing the furlough program.
To determine reasonableness, courts consider whether the state
can demonstrate a substantial record of considered alternatives.193
The Donohue court specifically stated that reference to the state’s
budgetary problems is not sufficient to constitute a finding of reasona-
bleness and necessity under the Contract Clause.194 In Professional En-
gineers, Governor Schwarzenegger failed to show that he considered
policy alternatives prior to implementing the two-day-a-month fur-
lough program by executive order. Rather, the Governor relied solely
on the fiscal emergency and the possibility that the state would be una-
ble to meet its financial obligations by February 2009.195 The Gover-
nor asserted that “in the December 1, 2008 fiscal emergency
extraordinary session, the Legislature failed to effectively address the
unprecedented statewide fiscal crisis.”196 However, he did not expand
on why the Legislature’s approach to the fiscal crisis was ineffective or
192. Glendale City Emps.’ Ass’n v. City of Glendale, 540 P.2d 609, 614 (Cal. 1975).
193. Donohue v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 306, 321–22 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
194. Id.
195. Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1192.
196. Id.
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why the furlough program was necessary. Simply put, Governor
Schwarzenegger’s public explanation for the furlough program failed
to carry the day.197
Similarly, the Legislature’s revised 2008 Budget Act makes only
brief mention of the Governor’s proposed furloughs, and certainly
does not include a substantial record of considered alternatives.198
The lack of transparency makes it impossible to determine whether
the Legislature considered policy alternatives before authorizing the
Governor’s furlough order. The California Supreme Court’s request
for supplemental briefing on whether the revised Budget Act affected
the validity of the furloughs demonstrates that it was unclear whether
the Legislature even intended the revised Budget Act to address the
Governor’s furloughs.199 The unions maintained that the revised
Budget Act had absolutely no effect on the validity of the Governor’s
furloughs.200 Furthermore, they argued that the language of the
Budget Act indicated the Legislature’s intent to protect each side’s
bargaining rights.201 The State argued the opposite conclusion, claim-
ing that in amending the Budget Act the Legislature intended to vali-
date the Governor’s use of furloughs to achieve personnel cost
savings.202 The parties’ diametrically opposed interpretations of the
revised Budget Act reflect the ambiguity of the revision. On this re-
cord, the Legislature failed to make the requisite showing of a “sub-
stantial record of considered alternatives.”203
A contractual impairment will likely not be considered reasona-
ble and necessary if the state imposed a drastic impairment when an
“evident and more moderate course was available.”204 A recent study
conducted by the University of California at Berkeley’s Center for La-
197. The deliberative processes surrounding executive orders are completely restricted
for fifty years following the Order (if any deliberative process even exists). Telephone In-
terview with Reference Librarian, Cal. State Archives (April 21, 2011).
198. See Office of Senate Floor Analyses, Cal. State Senate, Third Reading of S.B. 2,
2009–2010 Leg., 3d Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. Feb. 14, 2009), available at http://www.leg
info.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sbx3_2_cfa_20090214_215826_sen_floor.
html.
199. See Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1197 n.12. The California Supreme Court spent seven
pages discussing whether the revised 2008 Budget Act should be construed to authorize
the Governor’s furlough order. Id. at 1220–26.
200. Appellant’s Supplemental Letter Brief at 6, Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v.
Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 1186 (Cal. 2010) (No. S183411).
201. Id.
202. Supplemental Letter Brief in Response to Court’s June 9, 2010 Order at 8, Prof’l
Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 1186 (Cal. 2010) (No. S183411).
203. Donohue v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 306, 322 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
204. Id.
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bor Research and Education casts serious doubt on the reasonable-
ness and necessity of the furloughs.205 Drawing on standard economic
theory and empirical research, the Berkeley study found that the fur-
loughs were “a particularly inefficient method of addressing the
budget deficit.”206 It noted that while furloughs are formally reduc-
tions in hours worked, they also operate as wage reductions.207 The
study explained that wage reductions have long been uncommon in
recession because reducing wages can lead to a loss in productivity
that surpasses the savings gleaned.208 Wage reductions lead to losses
in productivity for three reasons. First, they affect employee morale,
making workers less likely to perform their job well.209 One commen-
tator noted that some employees would actually prefer a permanent
layoff to the continuing frustration of performing the same job duties
for less pay.210 Second, they create a higher turnover of employees,
forcing employers to spend money to hire and train new workers.211
Third, employers lose their most productive workers because these
workers have greater opportunities for outside advancement.212 Em-
ployers have an increased incentive to retain the most productive
workers during difficult economic periods.
The Berkeley study ultimately concluded that Governor
Schwarzenegger’s across the board furlough of state employees saves
little money in the long run.213 The study criticized Governor
Schwarzenegger’s decision to furlough all state employees, regardless
of funding source.214 Rather than limiting the furloughs to depart-
ments and positions subsidized by the General Fund,215 the Gover-
nor’s furloughs reached employees subsidized by special funds (which
205. KEN JACOBS, UC BERKELEY CTR. FOR LABOR RESEARCH & EDUC. POLICY BRIEF, THE
HIGH COST OF FURLOUGHS (2009), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/californiabudget/fur-
loughs09.pdf.
206. Id. at 1.
207. Id. at 3.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Green, supra note 179, at 1152.
211. JACOBS, supra note 205, at 3.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 7.
214. Id. at 2–3.
215. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 29301 (West 2008) provides: “The general fund consists of
money received into the treasury and not specifically appropriated to any other fund.”
California’s general fund finances most of the State’s expenditures. See Description of Fund
Classifications in the Treasury, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., http://www.dof.ca.gov/budgeting/budget
_faqs/documents/FundClassifications.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). Notably, the general
fund provides the resources for the State’s non-revenue generating departments. See JA-
COBS, supra note 205, at 2.
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are revenue-generating and self-supporting) and the federal govern-
ment.216 Targeting non-General Fund workers creates significant costs
to the General Fund. The Berkeley study projected that the furloughs
would result in losses due to state workers paying less into state in-
come taxes, reduced revenue collection due to cuts to the Franchise
Tax Board and Board of Equalization, and losses in revenue to the
California Public Employees’ Retirements System (“CalPERS”) as a re-
sult of state employees making lower contributions.217 Additional
costs to the General Fund include reduced fee collections by other
departments, litigation challenging the furloughs, and the cost of hir-
ing outside contract workers to compensate for time lost to fur-
loughs.218 When combined, these costs would offset a significant part
of the savings.219
Numerous alternatives existed that would have dealt more equita-
bly with California’s budget deficit. Most obviously, Governor
Schwarzenegger could have engaged in the collective bargaining pro-
cess to find solutions to lessen the hardship on state workers. The un-
ions likely would have been willing to make concessions if they had
been allowed to participate in the decision making process to decide
if and how to implement cost cutting measures. SEIU claimed that its
efforts to get information about the need for spending restrictions
were futile.220 The union claimed that the DPA knew of the impend-
ing crisis since August of 2008 and “squandered multiple opportuni-
ties . . . to find creative solutions to lessen the impact on state
workers.”221 SEIU’s willingness to compromise is not merely specula-
tion: in February 2009 the union negotiated a contract with Governor
Schwarzenegger for the 2009–2010 fiscal year that included one
monthly furlough day.222 Though SEIU’s members ratified the con-
tract, the Governor later rejected it.223 This option would have been
216. Id. at 3.
217. Id. at 5.
218. Id.
219. Id. For the FY 2009–10 furloughs, the study estimates a reduction in wages and
benefits of $2.01 billion for 193,000 workers over the course of the year, with a net savings
of only $236 million to the General Fund. Id. at 1.
220. See Unions Challenge Furlough and Layoff Order, supra note 186, at 42 (“The union
also charges that DPA gave an inadequate response when Local 1000 asked for information
about the need for the spending restrictions.”).
221. Id.
222. JACOBS, supra note 205, at 3.
223. Id. In July 2009 Governor Schwarzenegger implemented a third monthly furlough
day. Id. The Berkeley study, focusing on the Governor’s three-day-a-month furlough, found
that if state workers were furloughed one rather than three days a month, the medium-
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preferable to the unilaterally imposed furloughs because it would
have generated far less opposition. Additionally, medium-term net sav-
ings to the General Fund would have been greater with a single
monthly furlough day, due to the smaller drop in revenue in subse-
quent years from a single furlough day.224
Governor Schwarzenegger could have also explored the possibil-
ity of voluntary reduced work time or paid leave as a means of cutting
costs.225 CASE demonstrated its willingness to explore voluntary re-
duced work time as an alternative to mandated furloughs.226 Another
option would be to limit furloughs to departments and positions that
are subsidized by the General Fund and therefore not revenue pro-
ducing.227 This would burden significantly fewer state employees,
while simultaneously reducing the economic impacts to the General
Fund. Still another alternative would be to increase taxes as Demo-
crats pushed for prior to the Executive Order. Though raising taxes is
admittedly a less politically expedient alternative, “[w]here reasonable
alternatives exist for addressing the fiscal needs of the State which do
not impair contracts, action taken that does impair such contracts is
not an appropriate use of State power.”228
Conclusion
Looking at Professional Engineers through the lens of the Contract
Clause demonstrates that the unions would have prevailed on their
Contract Clause challenge if the claim had been properly asserted
before the California Supreme Court. The analysis also illustrates how
honoring the Contract Clause would have been advantageous for both
the unions seeking to implement their rights and the California gov-
ernment officials seeking to remedy the state’s budget problems. In-
stead, Governor Schwarzenegger violated his contractual obligations
by making an end run around collective bargaining. Both the Gover-
nor and the Legislature failed to demonstrate that they considered
policy alternatives before impairing their own contracts. The result
was public employee outrage, unnecessary and costly litigation, and
term net savings to the General Fund would be $256 million, or $20 million more, with a
single monthly furlough day than with three furlough days. Id. at 1.
224. Id.
225. See Green, supra note 179 at 1170–71.
226. Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 1186, 1219 n.35 (Cal.
2010). In its MOU, CASE explicitly stated its willingness to experiment with voluntary re-
duced work time as an alternative to laying off employees. Id.
227. See JACOBS, supra note 205, at 7.
228. Donohue v. Paterson, 715 F. Supp. 2d 306, 322 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
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discord among California government officials. Had the Governor
honored the Contract Clause, the result would have been a more col-
laborative, better informed strategy for addressing California’s budget
crisis. California instead wasted state funds to defend an ineffective
and highly contentious policy.
Where do California’s public employees go from here? Profes-
sional Engineers plaintiffs will likely not pursue a federal Contract
Clause challenge. One of the reasons the unions initially declined to
raise the unconstitutional impairment of contract claim was that the
MOUs affected by the Governor’s Order had expired. Courts are di-
vided on the issue of whether expired labor contracts are protected by
the Contract Clause.229 Even though the MOUs in Professional Engi-
neers were technically expired, the contracts continued to bind the
parties by virtue of the continuing benefits provision of the Dills Act.
Indeed, Governor Schwarzenegger conceded this issue, and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court agreed that “[a]lthough each of the MOUs had
expired . . . the terms of the expired MOU remained in effect, be-
cause the parties had not reached an impasse in their negotiations
over a new MOU.”230
Looking forward, California public employees have returned to
the bargaining tables. They hope that Governor Jerry Brown, who
thirty years ago signed the law that gave state workers the right to col-
lectively bargain, will respect their rights.231 Several unions, including
PECG, have recently reached agreements on new MOUs.232 Cognizant
of the state’s continuing budget problems, the new MOUs make some
229. See Ass’n of Surrogates v. New York, 588 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 1992). New York’s highest
court found that a continuing benefits provision, similar to the California continuing bene-
fits provision, should be construed to extend an expired collective bargaining agreement
until a new agreement is negotiated. As such, the court found that the expired collective
bargaining agreement constituted a valid and subsisting contract between the parties, sub-
ject to protection under the Contract Clause. Id. at 53. The court reasoned that “[t]o hold
otherwise would mean that the State would be bound by the terms of an expired collective
bargaining agreement only so long as it wished to be bound.” Id. But see also R.I. Bhd. of
Corr. Officers v. Rhode Island, 357 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2004). The court found that the em-
ployer’s obligation to maintain the status quo arises under state labor law and not by con-
tract. Id. at 47. A full discussion of whether expired MOUs trigger the protection of the
Contract Clause is beyond the scope of this Comment.
230. Prof’l Eng’rs, 239 P.3d at 1219.
231. Jon Ortiz, The State Worker: Clock is Ticking on Six Union Contract, SACRAMENTO BEE
(Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.sacbee.com/2011/02/03/3373331/the-state-worker-clock-is-
ticking.html.
232. Tentative Agreement Between State of Cal. and Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t (PECG)
Covering Bargaining Unit 9, Professional Engineers, Effective April 1, 2011 Through July
1, 2013, http://www.dpa.ca.gov/bargaining/contracts/pdf/bu09/20110401-20130701/
20110324-tentative-agreement.pdf.
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concessions, including a one day a month personal leave program
which operates like a self-directed furlough.233 The MOUs explicitly
state that while the contract remains in effect, no additional furlough
program may be implemented.234 On May 16, 2011, the Legislature
approved and Governor Brown signed Senate Bill 151,235 which rati-
fied and implemented the new MOUs.236
The Contract Clause remains a powerful tool for public employ-
ees working under collective bargaining agreements in states like Wis-
consin.237 Commentators believe that the pension provisions of
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker’s Budget Repair Bill are ripe for
Contract Clause challenges.238 The impact of the pension provisions
on Wisconsin public employee pension rights parallels the impact of
the pay delay statutes at issue in University of Hawaii on Hawaii’s public
employees.239 The Wisconsin pension provisions, which effectively cut
two weeks of pay, will likely be found to substantially impair public
employee contracts. Because Wisconsin is a party the contract, a court
233. Summary of Collective Bargaining Agreement for Bargaining Unit 9 at 2 (2011),
http://www.dpa.ca.gov/bargaining/contracts/pdf/bu09/20110401-20130701/20110324-
summary.pdf. The Personal Leave Program (PLP 2011) reduces pay by approximately 5%.
Id.
234. Id.
235. S.B. 151, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). Consistent with existing law, this
bill provides that provisions of the MOUs that require the expenditure of funds will not
take effect unless funds for those provisions are specifically appropriated by the Legisla-
ture. Id. However, the bill makes an important departure. It does not mandate that the
funds for these provisions be approved by the Legislature in the Budget Act. Id. This feature
of the bill streamlines the appropriation process for state employee compensation because
it bypasses the annual partisan budget battles. The bill states that these provisions will take
effect even if the funds for the provisions are approved in other legislation. Id. If funds are
not specifically appropriated by the Legislature, the bill requires that the state employer
and the union meet and confer to renegotiate the affected provisions. Id.
236. Complete Bill History of S.B. 151, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011), available
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0151-0200/sb_151_bill_20110516_
history.html.
237. On June 14, 2011, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling
that enjoined the publication of the Governor’s Budget Repair Bill because of alleged vio-
lations of Wisconsin’s Open Meetings Law. State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 798 N.W.2d
436, 445 (Wis. 2011). In a 4-3 decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the lower
court judge did not possess jurisdiction to enjoin the legislative process and that she had
exceeded her authority in prohibiting publication of the bill. Id. at 439. In a scathing dis-
sent, Justice Abrahamson criticized the majority for “hastily reaching judgment” and writ-
ing an order “lacking reasoned, transparent analysis and incorporating numerous errors of
law and fact.” Id. at 451. Abrahamson also pointed out that the court improperly asserted
original jurisdiction to issue a ruling in the case. Id. at 453.
238. Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension Litiga-
tion, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 42), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1806018.
239. Id. at 43.
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addressing the issue will closely scrutinize the pension laws.240 Under
heightened scrutiny, Wisconsin’s $150 million budget deficit will likely
not constitute a legitimate public purpose justifying the substantial
contractual impairment.241
While the outcome for public employees in Wisconsin is difficult
to predict—given the political pressures from the executive and legis-
lative branches—the lesson learned from both Wisconsin and Califor-
nia is clear. In desperate economic times, the Contract Clause should
serve as an important reminder that the politically expedient choice is
not always the best one. Though it requires more effort to thoroughly
analyze the range of policy alternatives when addressing a fiscal crisis,
invoking the Contract Clause will result in a better outcome for both
state governments and public employees.
240. Id. at 45.
241. Id. at 44, 46.
